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Buddhism & Political Theory. Matthew J. Moore. New York, NY:  Oxford University Press, 
2016.  198 pp. (hardcover), US $78.00, ISBN 978-0-19-046551-3. 
Buddhism & Political Theory, by Matthew J. Moore, proposes to extract a political theory from 
the Pali language texts of the Buddhist religious tradition that is palatable to Western academic 
sensibilities so that it might be ushered into the company of contemporary political and ethical 
philosophy.  “Let me introduce you,” the book in essence says to the world of Western 
philosophy, “to a long overlooked, unusual, and interesting perspective on political and ethical 
theory that you really ought to include in your conversations.”   
What is striking about this approach to the texts is that it gives so little weight to Buddhism as a 
practice.  To be sure, the religious aspirations taken for granted by these canonical texts – 
elimination of dukkha1, escape from samsara2, achieving nibbana3 – all receive due attention in 
Moore’s discussion. But only as theoretical set pieces.  By which I mean, the teachings are 
treated as a collection of theoretical concepts that might be brought into a 21st century 
philosophical conversation. Toward what purpose, though?  Why, to make this conversation 
more diverse and interesting.  And what might be the value of that?  With that question we run 
up against another fundamental idea from this same body of teachings, which is that engaging in 
“speculative theories” is a misuse of one’s energy.   
We find this idea particularly in those early discourses that address the topic of the “undeclared 
questions.”4 In such texts, one of the Buddha’s many interlocutors – most famously, Vacchagotta 
and Malunkyaputta – declare that they are dissatisfied with his refusal to address certain 
speculative theories, such as whether the world is infinite or not, or whether the body and soul 
are the same or different.  In such dialogues, the Buddha simply refuses to engage in discussion 
of such topics.  The reasons he offers boil down to one simple idea:  such speculations do not aid 
in the effort to eliminate the sources of dukkha, and in fact are likely only to contribute to the 
problem. 
                                                          
1 Dukkha is the term typically translated as “suffering.”  As nearly all translators of Buddhist discourses 
and textual commentators today acknowledge, the term is better rendered as “dislocation,” or 
“unsatisfactoriness.”  It is important to understand that the first Noble Truth, that “life is dukkha,” is not a 
declaration that life is nothing but pain and misery.  Rather, the Truth is that as long as ordinary 
unenlightened people act out of a desire for self-satisfaction, their lives will be filled with dislocation and 
unsatisfactoriness – even if, like the Buddha himself, they are rich, well-born, good looking, and lead 
lives of pleasure and ease.  I will leave the concept untranslated in what follows, as I do in my teaching.   
2 Samsara is the cycle of rebirth.  Since rebirth and dukkha alike are caused by attachments, eliminating 
the second (which is the subject of the Third and Fourth Noble Truths) results also in an end to rebirth.  
As a result, it is a ubiquitous and unquestioned feature of the early Buddhist discourses (as well as 
contemporary Upanisadic teachings) that life’s highest goal is to escape rebirth.     
3 Most readers will be more familiar with the Sanskrit version of this concept, nirvana.  Nibbana is the 
Pali equivalent.   
4 See for instance, “The Shorter Discourse to Malunkyaputta (Cūļa-māluṅkya Sutta),” and “Discourse to 
Vacchagotta on Fire (Aggivacchagotta Sutta),” Chs. 8 & 10, respectively, in John J. Holder, editor & 
translator, Early Buddhist Discourses, (Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett, 2006), pp. 95-100, 117-122. 




From the practitioner’s perspective that suffuses the early Buddhist teachings, then, Buddhism & 
Political Theory represents a deeply ironic 21st century appropriation of a resolutely practical 
body of teachings for the purpose of spicing up the conversations of contemporary Western 
political and ethical theorists.  In fairness, Western political and ethical theory could well benefit 
from the introduction of an ancient and venerable perspective that challenges well-entrenched 
and questionable assumptions in the field.  For that reason, a book such as this could have a 
useful propaedeutic role to play in the academy.    
At the same time, from the standpoint of the teachings themselves (not to mention practitioners 
who take them seriously) there is something misguided about the whole project.  The book treats 
Buddhist teachings as a theoretical contribution to a theoretical conversation, the substance of 
which will (from the early Buddhist perspective) contribute nothing to the task of eliminating 
dukkha, and in fact may only add to the problem.  From the practical standpoint of early 
Buddhism, the book is an example of the very kind of activities that the Buddha’s teachings 
discourage.      
From the perspective of the contemporary academy, of course, such concerns are moot.  Theory 
is just what its members do.  Fair enough.  In what follows I will consider Buddhism & Political 
Theory from that perspective.  At the same time, respect for the teachings contained in the Pali 
Canon did seem to call for the preceding observations. 
Part I of Buddhism & Political Theory is devoted to identifying Buddhism’s theory of 
government.  As Moore acknowledges, it is risky to attribute a political theory to “Buddhism” 
(as a whole), given the many different traditions of Buddhist thought, and given the many 
different national and cultural contexts in which the Buddhist tradition has found a home.  For 
that reason he first turns his attention to the political theory to be found in the oldest collection of 
Buddhist texts, the Pali language canon, which is recognized as authoritative by all traditions of 
Buddhism the world over. 
Though the Pali Canon is a voluminous body of writing, there are but a few texts that specifically 
address issues of government. Moore reviews these to identify what they teach about 
government.  What he finds is that these texts all endorse enlightened monarchy as a political 
system.  Interestingly, though, he also finds quasi-mythical accounts suggesting that monarchical 
authority originated from a kind of primal social contract.  Subsequent to this ur-event, the 
legitimacy of the king’s authority rests on his spiritual righteousness.   
From the standpoint of modern political theory, the Mahāparanibbāna Sutta provides an 
interesting moment of dissent.  This text recounts how a ruler with territorial ambitions consults 
with the Buddha about his plans to conquer a neighboring state.  In his reply, the Buddha 
explains that in a previous consultation with the very people the King aspires to conquer, he had 
advised them to maintain certain practices that, charitably interpreted, amount to a quasi-
republican form of governance.  The Buddha then proceeds to recommend these practices as the 
proper way for the community of monks to manage its own affairs.  These quasi-republican 
themes along with the origin of monarchical authority in a primordial social contract represent, 
as it were, a counter narrative that – as Moore examines in chapter 3 – could be mined and 
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developed to aid Buddhist nations in their transition to modern forms of representative 
governance.     
It is important to note that Moore distinguishes here between what he calls theory of government 
and political theory.  The first simply concerns the kind of political regime that the early texts 
endorse and is the focus of Part I of this book.  The second concerns key ideas that form the 
foundation of this conception of government.  He identifies three:  the idea that individual 
identity is both illusory and harmful; a deflationary perspective on the role of politics in human 
life; and a naturalistic and non-realistic theory of morality.  Part II of the book is devoted to 
exploring those ideas.   
Chapters 2 and 3 of Part I examine the extent to which later Buddhist thinking adheres to the 
political theory found in the Pali Canon.  Chapter 2 looks at key texts from both the Theravāda 
and Mahayana Traditions of Buddhism and finds that, despite other differences, all endorse the 
basic ideas that concern enlightened monarchy that Moore unearthed from the earlier texts.  
Chapter 3 then turns to the interesting question of how 20th century Buddhist political leaders 
managed to reconcile this ancient tradition of monarchical thinking with the republican 
transformation undergone by Buddhist majority nations during the 20th century.  The bulk of this 
chapter summarizes the work of empirical political scientists who have closely examined these 
political events. We find among these analysts, Moore shows us, two broad perspectives.  One 
group of scholars suggests that the use of Buddhist teachings to legitimate the transition was 
simply an exercise in cynical realpolitik.  The other suggests that the transition to republican 
forms of government was motivated and justified through a good-faith reinterpretation of the 
early texts, which highlighted those dimensions that seem to support popular sovereignty.  In 
reviewing this research, Moore finds support for both perspectives.    
The upshot of Part I is that Buddhist teachings traditionally endorse an enlightened monarchy, 
but also acknowledge certain elements of republican governance – in particular, the idea that 
legitimate government authority originates in an implicit social contract.  These republican 
elements, in turn, allowed 20th century Buddhist leaders to reconcile their traditions with the 
transformation of their national governments from a monarchical to a representative form.   
Part II of the book contains what, for Moore, is clearly the philosophical heart of the matter.  
While traditional Buddhist teachings support enlightened monarchy, what makes the perspective 
found in the Pali Canon philosophically interesting are the ideas underlying this theory of 
government.   
Chapter 4 addresses the first of these ideas, the illusion of individual identity, via a comparison 
between Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology and the Buddhist teaching of anatta, or “no self.”  
What Moore shows here is that Nietzsche and the Buddhist texts offer strikingly similar analyses 
concerning the structure of the self.  Both reject any notion of a metaphysical self, the idea that 
there is any kind of enduring, unchanging ontological reality corresponding with a person’s 
phenomenal experience of self. Both carry out analyses demonstrating that the phenomenon 
labelled “self” is actually a collection of discrete and dynamic psychological processes.  Both 
attempt, with uncertain success, to show how this collection of processes can give rise to a 




contingent psychological entity that is the basis for the experience of self, what Moore calls a 
“persistent self.”  Both warn against mistaking this contingent entity as having any enduring 
ontological reality.  In this sense, both insist that the self is an illusion.   
Where Nietzsche and the Buddhist teachings differ concerns what they regard as an appropriate 
response to these insights.  Nietzsche famously suggested that insofar as one’s self is actually a 
labile phenomenon, one should engage in an ongoing project of self-creation. Fundamental to 
Buddhist teachings, by contrast, is the supposition that attachment to self is a fundamental source 
of dukkha and a cause of rebirth.  As a consequence, the practitioner’s task is to abandon any 
attachment to, investment in, or ideas about the existence of a separate self.   
Moore thinks that the Buddhist perspective carries the day. In the first place, textual evidence 
indicates that even Nietzsche acknowledges that the illusion of self is unnecessary for 
maintaining a coherent psychological structure, which is the Buddhist default position. Further, 
in a long engagement with a series of Nietzsche’s interpreters, Moore argues that they are 
mistaken to suppose that a person’s capacity to commit to normative ideals requires some belief 
in a persistent self.  (Since Nietzsche’s texts are ambiguous on this question, Moore interrogates 
interpreters who are not.) 
Surprisingly, given the task of the book, in the last section of the chapter Moore begs off a 
detailed discussion of the relevance of these two perspectives on the self to political theory and 
practice. Instead, in a few paragraphs, he first points out how both Nietzsche and the Buddhist 
teachings suggest that belief in a metaphysical self is likely to foster antisocial behavior. Then, in 
a neat move, Moore shows how by acknowledging this possibility Nietzsche forces himself – 
more or less – to accept the Buddhist perspective.  Nietzsche contended that belief in a 
metaphysical self would give rise to ressentiment. Hence the resolute (quasi-) subject must 
accept the fictitious nature of the self and construct a sense of identity on that basis.  Moore 
argues, though, that if one remains committed, as Nietzsche proposes, to even a self-consciously 
constructed self, the psychological roots of ressentiment may well persist.  Just so, the Buddhist 
tradition would reply.  Attachment – especially attachment to fictions – gives rise to dukkha.   
Chapter 5 addresses the theory of limited citizenship endorsed by the early Buddhist texts. Such 
theories, Moore tells us, rest on four claims.  The first is that political institutions and activity are 
both inevitable and potentially beneficial.  Second, they are morally and practically important 
enough to require systematic normative guidance.  Third, despite the preceding pair of 
concessions, political institutions and action are nonetheless less important than other human 
concerns.  As a result, thoughtful people have good reason to devote relatively little of their time 
and energy to them.  Finally, political institutions and action have little capacity to either help or 
hinder people in their pursuit of the goals that are, in fact, most important for human life. 
After examining passages from the early Pali texts that support a theory of limited citizenship, 
Moore then reviews representative figures from the Western tradition of political thought who 
also endorse this perspective:  Socrates, Epicurus, Thoreau (at some length) and John Howard 
Yoder (an American Mennonite theologian).   
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Moore then turns to the question whether limited citizenship is theoretically defensible.  It is here 
that the book begins to feel hurried.  His review of Western political theorists suggests that 
limited citizenship is an option that the Western tradition of political theory has not taken very 
seriously.  The sequence of charges laid against limited citizenship, to which Moore briefly 
responds (that it is parasitic, irrelevant, irresponsible, an expression of class privilege, and that it 
leads to incomplete human development), shows that Western political thinkers consider limited 
citizenship to be a dangerous idea.  In other words, we discover through this discussion that the 
thinking of the Buddhist tradition about politics seems to challenge some very deeply held 
Western assumptions.  But instead of exploring this tension more fully, Moore simply appeals to 
value pluralism to resolve it.  His argument is plausible, though sketchy, but it does not really do 
what he wants to do, which is to convince Western political and moral theorists that the Buddhist 
tradition has got a challenging alternative conception that they need to take seriously.   
In Chapter 6, Moore argues that Buddhist ethics represents a version of ethical naturalism. 
Borrowing Kant’s distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, he contends that 
the best reading of the early texts reveals a fundamentally descriptive, or “hypothetical” theory 
of ethics.  Certain kinds of actions, the tradition teaches, are more intelligently conceived (more 
“skillful”) than others, not because they conform to some absolute standard of right and wrong, 
but because they are more or less likely to bring about desirable consequences.   
Moore suggests that this ethical perspective should interest contemporary Western political 
theorists for a number of reasons, but here, again, the discussion is not entirely satisfactory. He 
contends that early Buddhist thinking could have a place in current conversations about 
naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethics.  Politically, this also means that Buddhist thinking 
resonates with a Western tradition of political thought that tries to articulate political ethics in an 
entirely naturalistic language, rejecting appeals to supernatural, mystical, or metaphysical ideas.  
What troubles me about this suggestion is that it appears simply to assimilate Buddhist thinking 
to an established set of Western assumptions and priorities.  Only to the extent that the thinking 
of the Pali Canon can fit within Western theoretical norms, the argument seems to imply, will it 
be “interesting” to Western political and ethical theorists.  Whether or not this is correct is an 
empirical question – Western theorists could just as well ignore these texts for essentially similar 
reasons, namely, that they do badly or only implicitly what the Western theorists already do 
explicitly and well.  But such considerations seem to miss the question motivating the book, 
which is whether the Buddhist tradition has something genuinely new or different to offer to 
conversations in the Western academy.  Such a contribution, one imagines, should amount to 
more than just “fitting in” with the tribe.       
This uncertainty of purpose is nicely illustrated by the final sections of this chapter, where Moore 
turns to an objection raised against hypothetical ethical theories, which is that they won’t possess 
the “normative force” required to constrain human behavior.  This objection, he avers, threatens 
to call into question the capacity of early Buddhist political and ethical thinking to provide a 
satisfactory justification for republican government institutions.  To show how Buddhist ethical 
theory might address this problem, however, Moore turns to the political theory of William 
Connolly, who he regards as the most successful contemporary defender of a naturalistic and 




non-realist political ethics.  But notice what has just happened.  The political and ethical ideas of 
the Pali Canon, which were to bring something fresh and interesting to Western scholarship, 
suddenly need to be rescued by a Western scholar.  Perhaps I am overstating things here.  Still, it 
remains the case that Buddhism & Political Theory does not seriously investigate how the 
naturalist, non-realist position contained in the Pali language texts might be defended on its own 
terms. 
In the end, what Buddhism & Political Theory shows us is that early Buddhist thinking 
anticipates developments in contemporary philosophy.  The Pali language texts endorse ethical 
perspectives that continue to occupy 21st century theorists, engage in a resolute deconstruction of 
the human subject millennia before Nietzsche (and his poststructuralist readers), and advance 
ideas of limited citizenship that contradict republican traditions of engaged citizenship so 
prevalent in the West.  And while the early Buddhist texts endorse conceptions of enlightened 
monarchy, they also contain an undercurrent of popular sovereignty that allowed the tradition to 
adapt to modern representative political movements.  What Moore’s book does not show, 
though, is that early Buddhist thinking offers conceptual or philosophical insights that might 
destabilize the dogmas of current Western political and ethical theory.   
Charles W. Wright 
College of St. Benedict/ St. John’s University 
